What Is Private Credit? The $3.5 Trillion Shadow Banking Market Explained
Author: Meesam Abbas | Last Updated: June 2026 | Sources: Federal Reserve, IMF, BIS, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley, AIMA/Alternative Credit Council, Wellington Management, McKinsey
Private credit — lending that happens outside the traditional banking system, away from public markets, and largely invisible to ordinary investors — has grown into a $3.5 trillion global market that now rivals the entire US high-yield bond market in size. (Alternative Credit Council, December 2025) When JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon warned in October 2025 that "when you see one cockroach, there are probably more," he was not speaking about pest control — he was warning that the collapse of subprime auto lender Tricolor Holdings and auto-parts supplier First Brands might be early signals of deeper stress in private credit markets that nobody can fully see. (Bloomberg, October 2025) This article explains what private credit is, how it became so large, what the risks are, and what it means for the financial system — and for you.
Key Takeaways
- The global private credit market has reached $3.5 trillion in assets under management — growing roughly five times since 2009 and deploying $592.8 billion in new capital in 2024 alone, up 78% from 2023. (Alternative Credit Council, December 2025)
- Private credit grew primarily because post-2008 banking regulations reduced bank appetite for middle-market lending — in 1994, US banks underwrote over 70% of middle market loans; by 2020, that figure had fallen to just 10%. (Federal Reserve, May 2025)
- JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon issued a direct warning in October 2025 after Tricolor Holdings and First Brands collapsed: "When you see one cockroach, there are probably more. Everyone should be forewarned on this one." JPMorgan wrote off $170 million linked to Tricolor. (Bloomberg, October 2025)
- The Federal Reserve's May 2026 Financial Stability Report confirmed the Fed is monitoring private credit for redemption-related strains and potential spillovers to bank credit availability — describing Q1 2026 redemptions as "manageable" but flagging ongoing risks. (Federal Reserve, May 2026)
- Morgan Stanley estimates private credit will grow from $3 trillion in 2025 to approximately $5 trillion by 2029 — but regulators at the Federal Reserve, IMF, and BIS have all flagged illiquidity, opacity, and systemic contagion as the market's defining risks. (Morgan Stanley, 2025)
- Global private credit AUM: $3.5 trillion — Alternative Credit Council, December 2025
- US private credit AUM: approximately $1.34 trillion (2024-Q2) — Federal Reserve, May 2025
- Growth since 2009: approximately five times — Federal Reserve, May 2025
- 2024 capital deployment: $592.8 billion (up 78% from 2023) — Alternative Credit Council, December 2025
- Fund-level leverage: $398 billion borrowing = ~32% of net AUM — Alternative Credit Council, December 2025
- Non-accrual rate (corporate lending): 1.8% weighted average — Alternative Credit Council, December 2025
- Morgan Stanley growth forecast: $3 trillion (2025) → $5 trillion (2029) — Morgan Stanley, 2025
- Non-traded BDC assets: grew from zero in 2021 to over $200 billion by 2025
- Five largest private credit platforms (Apollo, Ares, Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR): combined $1.5 trillion in perpetual capital
- US middle market bank share: 70% (1994) → 10% (2020) — Federal Reserve, May 2025
What Is Private Credit?
The IMF's April 2024 Global Financial Stability Report defines private credit as "debt investments that are not issued or traded on public markets and typically involve direct lending by non-bank institutions to firms." Private credit strategies include direct lending, mezzanine financing, distressed debt, and specialty finance. (IMF, April 2024) The Bank for International Settlements adds a critical qualification: private credit involves "limited secondary market liquidity" — meaning these loans cannot be easily bought or sold after they are made. (BIS, March 2026)
In plain language, private credit is what happens when a company needs to borrow money and goes to an investment fund instead of a bank or the bond market. The fund negotiates the loan terms directly — interest rate, repayment schedule, covenants, collateral — and holds the loan on its books until it is repaid. There is no secondary market where other investors can buy or sell the loan in the meantime. The terms are private. The valuation is private. The risk is private.
This opacity is what makes private credit both attractive and concerning. Attractive because borrowers get flexibility and speed that public markets cannot offer. Attractive to lenders because they earn higher interest rates — typically 400 to 600 basis points above benchmark rates for direct lending — in exchange for accepting illiquidity. Concerning because regulators, policymakers, and even sophisticated investors have limited visibility into what is actually in these loan books, how they are valued, and how stressed they are becoming in real time.
The Federal Reserve's own researchers put it directly in a May 2025 note: private credit is "a relatively small fraction of the overall credit provided to nonfinancial businesses," but "the lack of transparency and understanding of the interconnectedness between private credit and the rest of the financial system makes it difficult to assess the implications for systemic vulnerabilities." (Federal Reserve, May 2025)
How Big Is the Private Credit Market?
The scale of the private credit market has surprised even its own participants. At the start of 2009, the market barely existed in its current institutional form. By 2020 it had reached approximately $700 billion globally. By 2024-Q2 the Federal Reserve measured global private credit at nearly $2 trillion — having grown roughly five times since 2009. (Federal Reserve, May 2025) By end of 2024, the Alternative Credit Council put global AUM at $3.5 trillion — a figure that reflects new capital commitments as well as unrealized returns on existing portfolios. (Alternative Credit Council, December 2025)
Morgan Stanley estimates the market at $3 trillion at the start of 2025 — compared to approximately $2 trillion in 2020 — and projects growth to approximately $5 trillion by 2029. (Morgan Stanley, 2025) These figures vary because different institutions define the market boundaries differently — some include real estate debt and infrastructure lending, others focus only on corporate direct lending — but the directional story is consistent: this market has grown faster than any other significant segment of global credit in the post-financial-crisis era.
The deployment numbers reveal how active the market has become. In 2024, private credit funds deployed $592.8 billion in new lending — up 78% from 2023 deployment volumes. (Alternative Credit Council, December 2025) That pace of deployment — nearly $600 billion in new loans in a single year — means private credit is no longer a niche alternative for specialist investors. It is a foundational part of how mid-sized and large companies in the United States and Europe access capital. As a comparison point, Wellington Management notes that middle market direct lending is now roughly the same size as the large broadly syndicated loan market and the high-yield bond market combined — two markets that have existed for decades and are followed closely by mainstream financial media.
Why Private Credit Grew: The Post-2008 Bank Retreat
The story of private credit's rise is inseparable from the story of bank regulation after 2008. The global financial crisis demonstrated that banks had taken on far too much risk in their lending books — particularly in complex, opaque credit instruments. The regulatory response was sweeping: Basel III required banks to hold more capital against risky loans, increasing the cost of keeping complex corporate loans on their balance sheets. Dodd-Frank added enhanced supervision and resolution requirements that made certain lending activities less economically attractive for large banks. (BIS, March 2026)
The effect on middle-market lending was dramatic and measurable. The Federal Reserve documented the shift precisely: in 1994, US bank underwriting covered over 70% of middle market loans. By 2020, US banks issued or held around just 10% of middle market loans. (Federal Reserve, May 2025) The other 90% had to come from somewhere. Private credit funds — which are not banks, are not subject to the same capital requirements, and are not backstopped by deposit insurance — stepped into that gap. They could make loans that banks no longer wanted to hold, and they could charge a premium for doing so.
The zero interest rate environment that followed 2008 — and the even more extreme policy rates of 2020–2021 — added fuel to the fire from the investor side. When public bond yields are near zero, institutional investors cannot generate the returns they need to meet their obligations. Pension funds, insurance companies, and endowments all turned to private credit seeking the higher yields that direct lending could offer — typically 7% to 12% depending on the strategy and credit quality. The Federal Reserve's own Financial Stability Report acknowledged this dynamic directly: the prolonged near-zero interest rate environment pushed investors toward higher-yielding private assets. (Federal Reserve, May 2026)
The result was a virtuous cycle for private credit growth: more investor capital seeking yield flowed into private credit funds, giving those funds more money to deploy. More deployment gave them track records, which attracted more capital. The five largest private credit platforms — Apollo, Ares, Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR — now manage a combined $1.5 trillion in perpetual capital, approximately 40% of their combined AUM. The top 25 managers accounted for approximately 72% of total private credit fundraising in 2025 — a concentration that mirrors what happened in private equity a decade earlier, as scale became a defining competitive advantage.
How Private Credit Works: Direct Lending, Mezzanine, and Beyond
Direct lending is the dominant strategy and the one most people mean when they discuss private credit. A direct lender — typically a large fund like Ares, Blue Owl, or Apollo — makes senior secured loans directly to mid-market companies that need capital for acquisitions, growth, or refinancing. These loans are typically floating rate — meaning the interest rate adjusts with benchmark rates like SOFR — which provided natural protection when rates rose sharply in 2022-2023 and continues to be a selling point for investors concerned about [inflation] and rate volatility.
Mezzanine financing sits between senior debt and equity in a company's capital structure. It is junior to senior loans but senior to equity — meaning mezzanine lenders get paid before equity holders in a default but after senior lenders. The higher risk commands higher yields, typically 12% to 18% including payment-in-kind (PIK) interest. Mezzanine debt is commonly used in leveraged buyouts to bridge the gap between the senior debt a bank or direct lender will provide and the equity the private equity firm wants to contribute.
Distressed debt involves purchasing loans or bonds of companies that are already in financial difficulty — typically at significant discounts to face value — and profiting either from recovery in the company's fortunes or from the restructuring process. This strategy requires specialized legal and operational expertise and is generally the highest-risk, highest-potential-return corner of private credit.
Two rapidly growing areas are asset-backed finance — private credit secured against pools of financial assets like consumer loans, auto loans, or commercial real estate — and infrastructure lending, particularly for AI-related data centers. The scale of the AI infrastructure buildout has created lending opportunities that traditional bank syndicates cannot fully serve. Meta tapped private credit markets for $29 billion to finance the construction of a Louisiana data center, according to the Wall Street Journal — a single transaction larger than the entire private credit market of the 1990s. McKinsey estimates the data center opportunity for private credit is substantial, with Morgan Stanley projecting private credit could supply more than half the $1.5 trillion needed for global data center buildouts through 2028. For the broader AI infrastructure context, see [What Are the Magnificent Seven Stocks? The AI Giants Reshaping Wall Street].
The Jamie Dimon Warning: Cockroaches, Tricolor, and First Brands
The two events that triggered Dimon's warning arrived in rapid succession in autumn 2025. First, Tricolor Holdings — a Dallas-based subprime auto lender that provided loans to borrowers with weak credit scores — filed for bankruptcy in September 2025. Then, just weeks later, First Brands — a privately owned auto-parts supplier that had used private credit markets aggressively to fund acquisitions — filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, with newly appointed directors revealing up to $2.3 billion in unpaid loans that had been kept off the company's official balance sheet. The Department of Justice opened a criminal investigation into First Brands' borrowing practices.
At JPMorgan's Q3 2025 earnings call on October 14, Dimon put the two events in explicit systemic context: "My antenna goes up when things like that happen. I probably shouldn't say this, but when you see one cockroach, there are probably more. Everyone should be forewarned on this one." (Bloomberg, October 2025) The "cockroach" metaphor — drawn from a classic piece of Warren Buffett wisdom about corporate problems rarely appearing alone — was an explicit suggestion that Tricolor and First Brands were not isolated incidents but early indicators of broader stress in private credit portfolios that had not yet become visible.
JPMorgan itself wrote off $170 million linked to Tricolor — a relatively modest figure for a bank of JPMorgan's scale, but significant as a signal that even the world's most sophisticated bank had exposure to a private credit borrower that failed. Bloomberg noted that by October 17, 2025, "two regional US banks disclosed credit losses due to fraud in a week when investors were already on edge from the twin failures of Tricolor Holdings and First Brands Group." The pattern Dimon was flagging was precisely the one that preceded the 2008 financial crisis: seemingly idiosyncratic failures that share structural similarities — too much debt, too little transparency, opaque off-balance-sheet financing — spreading through interconnected lending networks in ways that are hard to track until they become impossible to ignore.
The full story of the Dimon warning, what it revealed about private credit underwriting standards, and what it means for investors is covered in depth in [Jamie Dimon's Cockroach Theory: What His 2026 Warning Means for Investors].
What Regulators Are Watching: The Federal Reserve, IMF, and BIS
The Federal Reserve's May 2026 Financial Stability Report is the most recent and authoritative assessment of where private credit risk stands. The Fed confirmed it is monitoring private credit specifically for redemption-related strains — the risk that investors try to withdraw money from semi-liquid private credit funds simultaneously, forcing forced asset sales — and for potential spillovers to bank credit availability if private credit funds contract. Q1 2026 redemptions were described as "manageable" but the language of the report makes clear this is an active area of regulatory concern rather than a resolved one. (Federal Reserve, May 2026)
The IMF's Global Financial Stability analysis identified four specific vulnerabilities that private credit's rapid growth has created: liquidity mismatches between what the funds promise investors and the illiquid assets they actually hold; limited transparency that prevents accurate risk assessment; leverage within the lending vehicles themselves; and potential interconnections with banks and insurers that could transmit private credit stress into the regulated financial system. (IMF, April 2024)
The BIS March 2026 Quarterly Review echoed these concerns, highlighting how private credit's opacity in credit quality can lead to what it calls "informational contagion" — a situation where uncertainty about the value of private credit assets spreads fear even to assets that are fundamentally sound, because nobody has enough information to distinguish the good from the bad. This is precisely the dynamic that amplified the 2008 financial crisis: the problem was not just the bad mortgages, it was the uncertainty about which mortgage-backed securities contained them. (BIS, March 2026)
One specific risk that multiple regulators have flagged is the growing entanglement between private credit and the regulated banking system. Banks lend to private credit funds, private credit funds lend to private equity-backed companies that also have bank relationships, and insurers increasingly invest in private credit as a higher-yielding alternative to corporate bonds. The Federal Reserve's own research found that understanding this web of interconnections is difficult even for sophisticated regulators — and that difficulty is itself a systemic risk. For context on how the Fed monitors broader financial stability, see [What Is the Federal Reserve? Definition, Role, and How It Affects You].
How Retail Investors Can Access Private Credit
For most of its history, private credit was accessible only to institutional investors — pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, and high-net-worth individuals who could commit large minimums and tolerate multi-year lockup periods. That access structure has changed dramatically in the past five years. The industry has built a new class of vehicles specifically designed to bring retail capital into private credit — and regulators have recently expanded the channels available to do so.
Business Development Companies — BDCs — are the primary retail vehicle. A BDC is a regulated closed-end fund that invests in the debt and equity of small and mid-sized companies, distributing most of its income to shareholders. The largest publicly traded BDCs include Ares Capital Corporation (ARCC), the largest BDC by assets, and several others managed by Apollo, Blue Owl, and Blackstone. Non-traded perpetual-life BDCs — which do not trade on exchanges but offer periodic liquidity windows — grew from essentially zero in 2021 to more than $200 billion in assets by 2025, reflecting the enormous appetite of retail wealth management channels for private credit yield.
Interval funds represent a second access route — regulated funds that allow investors to invest and withdraw on a periodic schedule, typically quarterly, rather than daily. Interval funds grew to nearly $450 billion by mid-2025, a 16% increase from year-end 2024 and a 77% increase since the end of 2022. Credit-focused strategies within interval funds have reached approximately $230 billion. (Wellington Management, December 2025)
The risks for retail investors accessing private credit through these vehicles are real and distinct from the risks of investing in public bonds or stocks. Liquidity mismatch is the primary concern — the underlying loans in a BDC or interval fund cannot be sold easily, but the fund structure promises some level of periodic liquidity to investors. In a stress scenario where many investors try to withdraw simultaneously, this creates the redemption pressure that the Federal Reserve is monitoring. Valuation opacity is the second concern — private credit loans are valued by the fund managers themselves using models rather than market prices, creating the possibility that deteriorating credit quality is not reflected in reported NAV until borrowers actually default. The 1.8% non-accrual rate reported by the industry for 2024 corporate lending is relatively benign by historical standards — but that figure is self-reported and difficult to independently verify.
What a Private Credit Crisis Would Mean for the Broader Economy
The direct economic consequence of a private credit contraction would fall primarily on the mid-sized businesses that depend on it for financing. These are companies too large for traditional small business lending and too small or complex for the public high-yield bond market — the exact segment that banks abandoned after 2008 and that private credit filled. If private credit funds contract sharply — through redemption pressure, rising defaults, or a loss of investor confidence — the companies they lend to would face a funding vacuum. In a severe scenario, this would translate directly into reduced business investment, workforce reductions, and accelerated bankruptcies at the mid-market level.
The knock-on effects to the broader financial system would depend on the degree of interconnection. Banks that have lent to private credit funds would face credit losses. Insurers that have allocated to private credit in search of higher yields would face mark-downs. The asset-backed finance structures that now fund consumer loans and real estate through private credit channels would face pressure. The Federal Reserve, IMF, and BIS all flag this transmission mechanism as the key systemic risk — not because a private credit crisis is inevitable, but because the opacity of the market makes it difficult to identify stress early enough to contain it before it spreads. (Federal Reserve, May 2026)
The Tricolor-First Brands episode of 2025 was the first real-world stress test of whether Jamie Dimon's cockroach theory would prove correct — and the answer, as of mid-2026, is ambiguous. The failures were significant enough to generate substantial regulatory attention and a Bloomberg opinion column headline about cockroaches "living in risk markets' heads." But they were also contained enough that the Federal Reserve characterized the subsequent redemption pressures as manageable rather than systemic. Whether that containment holds as interest rates, credit quality, and investor sentiment continue to evolve in 2026 is the central question for private credit markets in the months ahead. For the US national debt context and how tightening credit conditions interact with government financing, see [What Is the US National Debt? Why $38 Trillion Matters to Every Investor].
Frequently Asked Questions
What is private credit?
Private credit refers to debt investments that are not issued or traded on public markets, typically involving direct lending by non-bank institutions to companies. The IMF defines it as encompassing direct lending, mezzanine financing, distressed debt, and specialty finance. Unlike public bonds, private credit loans have limited secondary market liquidity — they cannot easily be bought or sold after the loan is made. The global private credit market has reached $3.5 trillion in assets under management as of 2025.
Why has private credit grown so fast?
Private credit grew primarily because post-2008 banking regulations made banks less willing to hold complex middle-market loans. Basel III and Dodd-Frank increased capital requirements and compliance costs for bank lending to riskier corporate borrowers. In 1994, US banks underwrote over 70% of middle market loans; by 2020 that had fallen to just 10%. Private credit funds — which are not subject to the same capital rules — filled the gap, charging higher interest rates for accepting the risk and illiquidity that banks no longer wanted.
What did Jamie Dimon say about private credit?
At JPMorgan's Q3 2025 earnings call, CEO Jamie Dimon warned: "My antenna goes up when things like that happen. I probably shouldn't say this, but when you see one cockroach, there are probably more. Everyone should be forewarned on this one." The comment followed the back-to-back bankruptcies of Tricolor Holdings and First Brands — two private-credit-backed companies — and JPMorgan's own $170 million writeoff linked to Tricolor. Dimon was warning that these failures might be early signals of deeper stress in private credit portfolios that nobody could fully see.
What is Tricolor Holdings and why does it matter?
Tricolor Holdings was a Dallas-based subprime auto lender that specialized in loans to borrowers with weak credit scores. It filed for bankruptcy in September 2025, prompting JPMorgan to write off $170 million in related bad debt. Tricolor's collapse was one of the triggers for Jamie Dimon's cockroach warning — and was compared by CNN to Bear Stearns' near-collapse in 2008 because of the structural similarities: subprime borrowers, complex off-balance-sheet financing, and private credit exposure that was not fully transparent until the failure occurred.
What are the risks of private credit?
The BIS, IMF, and Federal Reserve have all identified four primary risks. Illiquidity: private credit loans cannot be easily sold, creating stress if investors want their money back simultaneously. Opacity: valuations are self-reported by fund managers using models rather than market prices, making it difficult to assess true credit quality. Leverage: private credit funds themselves borrow money, amplifying both returns and losses. Systemic contagion: private credit is increasingly interconnected with banks, insurers, and pension funds in ways that could spread stress across the financial system if defaults rise sharply.
Can retail investors invest in private credit?
Yes, though with important caveats. Business Development Companies (BDCs) are publicly traded or registered vehicles that invest in private credit and distribute income to shareholders — they are the most accessible retail route. Non-traded perpetual-life BDCs grew from zero in 2021 to over $200 billion in assets by 2025. Interval funds and semi-liquid credit vehicles have also expanded rapidly. The risks retail investors must understand include liquidity restrictions, valuation opacity, and dividend sustainability — returns that look attractive on paper may not hold if the underlying credit quality deteriorates.
What is a Business Development Company (BDC)?
A Business Development Company is a regulated closed-end fund that invests in the debt and equity of small and mid-sized companies, distributing most of its income to shareholders. BDCs are created under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and must meet specific diversification and leverage requirements regulated by the SEC. The largest publicly traded BDC is Ares Capital Corporation (ARCC). BDCs typically offer yields higher than investment-grade bonds but carry credit risk, liquidity risk, and sensitivity to the economic cycle affecting the mid-market borrowers they lend to.
How does private credit differ from bank loans?
Bank loans are made by regulated deposit-taking institutions subject to capital requirements, regulatory supervision, and government backstops like deposit insurance. Private credit loans are made by investment funds that are not banks, not subject to the same capital rules, not deposit-backed, and not government-insured. Private credit typically involves more bespoke loan terms negotiated directly between lender and borrower, less public disclosure, higher interest rates reflecting the illiquidity premium, and longer hold periods. The borrowers are typically mid-market companies that cannot access public bond markets or do not want the disclosure requirements of public debt.
What are the largest private credit firms?
The five largest listed private markets managers — Apollo, Ares Management, Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR — now manage a combined $1.5 trillion in perpetual capital, approximately 40% of their total AUM. Blue Owl Capital is also a major dedicated private credit firm. Together, the top 25 private credit managers accounted for approximately 72% of total industry fundraising in 2025, reflecting the concentration of capital and deal flow in the largest platforms. The seven largest platforms grew their AUM at approximately 20% annually from 2022 to 2025.
What is the Federal Reserve doing about private credit risks?
The Federal Reserve's May 2026 Financial Stability Report confirmed the Fed is actively monitoring private credit for redemption-related strains and potential spillovers to bank credit availability. Q1 2026 redemption pressures were described as "manageable" but the Fed flagged that continued redemptions could affect credit availability for mid-market borrowers. The Federal Reserve's own researchers have noted that the interconnectedness between private credit and the rest of the financial system is difficult to assess due to opacity — a concern shared by the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements.
Sources and Further Reading
- Federal Reserve. Bank Lending to Private Credit: Size, Characteristics, and Financial Stability Implications. May 2025. [https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/bank-lending-to-private-credit-size-characteristics-and-financial-stability-implications-20250523.html]
- Federal Reserve. Financial Stability Report. May 2026. [https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20260508.pdf]
- IMF. The Rise and Risks of Private Credit — Global Financial Stability Report Chapter 2. April 2024. [https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/display/book/9798400257704/9798400257704.pdf]
- Bank for International Settlements. BIS Quarterly Review — Private Credit. March 2026. [https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2603.pdf]
- Alternative Credit Council / AIMA. Financing the Economy 2025 — Private Credit Market Reaches $3.5 Trillion. December 2025. [https://www.aima.org/article/press-release-strong-growth-sees-private-credit-market-reach-us-3-5-trillion.html]
- Morgan Stanley. Private Credit Outlook and Considerations. 2025. [https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/private-credit-outlook-considerations]
- Wellington Management. Private Credit Outlook 2026. December 2025. [https://www.wellington.com/en/insights/private-credit-outlook]
- Bloomberg. Dimon's Cockroach Fear Revives Threat of Growing Credit Cracks. October 2025. [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-14/dimon-s-cockroach-fear-revives-threat-of-growing-credit-cracks]
Private credit has transformed from a niche alternative investment into a $3.5 trillion market that now determines financing conditions for hundreds of thousands of mid-sized companies across the United States and Europe. Its growth has been a direct consequence of bank regulation, investor hunger for yield, and the structural withdrawal of traditional lenders from middle-market lending. Whether it develops into the next major source of systemic financial risk — or continues to operate as a well-managed alternative to bank credit — depends on questions of transparency, underwriting discipline, and regulatory oversight that are being debated in real time. Jamie Dimon's cockroaches are still being counted. For the broader context on how debt and credit risk connect to the US economy's vulnerabilities, see [What Is the US National Debt? Why $38 Trillion Matters to Every Investor] and [What Is a Bond? Investment Bonds Explained].
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